In the study of natural language quantification, much recent attention has been devoted to the investigation of verification procedures associated with the proportional quantifier most (e.g. Hackl, 2009; Lidz, Pietroski, Hunter and Halberda, 2011; Solt, 2011; Kotek, Sudo, Howard and Hackl, 2011; Pietroski, Lidz, Hunter, Odic and Halberda, 2012; Kotek, Sudo, Howard and Hackl, 2012) . The aim of these studies is to go beyond the traditional characterization of the semantics of most, which is confined to explicating its truth-functional and presuppositional content as well as its combinatorial properties, as these aspects underdetermine the correct analysis of most.
Introduction: Most in subject position
It is well-known that most in object position has both proportional uses, in which case it appears in its bare form and can be reasonably well paraphrased using more than half, (1a), and superlative uses similar to the reading that is obtained when most combines with certain kinds of degree predicates (e.g. most expensive car). In those cases, most is accompanied by the definite article, (1b) (Bresnan 1973) .
(1) a. John talked to most students. proportional ≈ John talked to more than half of the students b. John talked to the most students. superlative ≈ John talked to more students than anybody else There have been several attempts in the literature to relate the two uses of most (e.g. Pinkham 1985 , Yabushita 1999 , Hackl 2009 , Krasikova 2011 , Szabolsci 2012 , but the canonical view is that this is a case of lexical ambiguity, with bare most a quantificational determiner (Barwise and Cooper 1981) , and the most a superlative construction (e.g. Szabolcsi 1986 ). 1 When most occurs in subject position, it has been noted that only bare most is grammatical. The most is degraded and even ungrammatical for many speakers, (2).
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(2) a. Most of the students talked to John.
b.
??
The most students talked to John.
The range of possible interpretations available to bare most in subject position as well as the associated verification strategies have become a central topic of debate in recent years. More specifically, while it is uncontroversial that bare most in subject position can give rise to proportional truth-conditions similar to the ones expressed by more than half, it has been argued in Hackl (2009) that the verification strategy associated with it is quite different from the one associated with more than half and reflects its superlative morpho-syntax. Moreover, Kotek et al. (2011) have argued that bare most in subject position is ambiguous between a (preferred) proportional reading and a (latent) superlative reading. By contrast, Lidz et al. (2011) found no evidence for a superlative construal in the truth-conditional import of bare most in subject position or in the verification strategy associated with it. Consequently, their analysis of bare most does not recognize any relationship between bare most and the most.
The present paper presents novel experimental evidence which supports a decompositional analysis of most, according to which both the most and bare most are built from the same basic ingredients -a gradable predicate many/much and the superlative operator -est -but project different LFs, Hackl (2009) . It also argues that the seemingly conflicting set of empirical results from previous studies can be understood within this structural ambiguity view once the differences in experimental techniques employed by the various researchers are properly factored in. The paper is composed as follows: In section 2 we briefly review the debate between the approach that views most as a lexical primitive and the approach which views most as a complex superlative construction. In Section 3 we present novel data from two experiments that support the view that most is uniformly a superlative construction. Section 4 is a discussion of the results of the experiments and their implications for the theory of most. Section 5 discusses previous work on most, notably the work in Lidz et al. (2011) , which uses a very similar experiment but reaches very different conclusions about the nature of most than we report in this paper. We address several concerns with the experiment in Lidz et al. (2011) and with the conclusions that were drawn based on this experimental work. Section 6 is the conclusion.
reading of most essentially as in (4) above. The proportional reading, on the other hand, is analyzed as in (5) (see also Krasikova (2011) and Szabolcsi (2012) for more recent discussion). (5)(5b) is parallel to (4b) except that (i) the comparison class C is assumed to be the set of student pluralities rather than the set of contextually relevant people who talked to students and (ii) non-identity is assumed to hold between any two alternatives in C if they are nonoverlapping pluralities of students. The symbol  is used to represent the no-overlap relation, which replaces the non-identity relation ≠ of (4b). (5a) is true just in case there is a plurality of students, X, that John talked to that is more numerous than all student pluralities that have no overlap with X. This amounts to demanding that there be a plurality of students that John talked to that is more numerous than the student plurality that John did not talk to. Thus, (5a) expresses proportional truth-conditions even though it is analyzed as a superlative construction. It is true just in case John talked to more than half of the students.
5
The lexical ambiguity view of most and the structural ambiguity view of most make diverging predictions with regard to the ability of bare most to take on a superlative reading. Consider a case where bare most occurs in subject position, as in (6a). The semantic analyses assumed for such a sentence by the lexical ambiguity view and the structural ambiguity view are given in (6b-c), respectively. Under the lexical ambiguity view of most, (6a) should only have proportional truth-condition, (7a). Under the structural ambiguity approach to most, however, which truth-conditions are expressed depends on the content of the comparison class, C. If C is identified with the extension of the plural NP dots, i.e. closed under individual sum formation (Link 1983) , proportional truthconditions result. This is because all dot pluralities different from the blue dots -whether they are homogenous in color or not -need to be less numerous than the blue dots for the sentence to be true. However, if C is not closed under individual sum formation but further constrained e.g. so that only homogenously colored dot pluralities are included (as proposed in Kotek et al. (2011), (6c) only requires that the blue dots outnumber each of the non-blue dot pluralities separately rather than having to outnumber the non-blue dots as a whole. Under such a construal of C, then, (6a) expresses superlative truth-conditions, (7b). 6 (7) a. Proportional truth-conditions |blue dots| > |non-blue dots| b. Superlative truth-conditions
For each non-blue color Z, |blue dots| > |Z dots|
To see more concretely how (7a-b) diverge, consider the dot arrays in Figures 1-2 . According to the proportional truth-conditions, (7a), Most of the dots are blue is true just in case more than half of the dots in the array are blue. An example of such an array is given in Figure 1 , where the 9 blue dots comprise more than half of all the dots and consequently outnumber the non-blue dots. Note that both the lexical ambiguity view of most and the structural ambiguity view of most make the same prediction about the verification of most with regard to Figure 1 : speakers should judge the sentence as true in this figure.
Fig. 1 Most of the dots are blue is true under both readings
The two theories make diverging predictions about the verification of most statements with regard to dot arrays as in Figure 2 . This array contains 7 blue dots, 4 red dots and 4 yellow dots. Hence, there are more non-blue dots than blue dots. The lexical ambiguity view of most assigns only proportional truth-conditions to the statement Most of the dots are blue and therefore predicts that it should be judged false. Under the structural ambiguity view of most, on the other hand, Most of the dots are blue has a superlative reading in addition to the proportional reading, and that reading is true in Figure 2 . In particular, under the superlative reading of most the number of blue dots is compared to the number of red dots and to the number of yellow dots separately. Since in both comparisons the blue set comes out as more numerous than the competitor, the sentence is true. Therefore while the lexical ambiguity view of most predicts that speakers will verify the most statement as false, the structural ambiguity view of most allows speakers to verify the most statement as either true or false with regard to Figure 2 . In the remainder of this paper we will refer to pictures as in Figure 2 , which are true only under the superlative reading of most, as 'superlative' pictures or pictures in the 'superlative' condition. We will use the term 'superlative verification strategy' to refer to the idea that speakers verify a sentence according to superlative truth-conditions, and the term 'proportional verification strategy' to refer to the idea that they verify a sentence according to proportional truth-conditions. Two previous studies, Lidz et al. (2011) and Kotek et al. (2011) have studied the behavior of most in subject position in sentences such as Most of the dots are blue, where the sentence is verified against a picture containing blue dots and dots in other colors, in various configurations. Despite many similarities between the studies, they reach opposite conclusions: Lidz et al. (2011) find that most is unambiguous and only has a proportional reading.
7 Kotek et al. (2011) find that most is ambiguous between a dominant proportional reading and a latent superlative reading. Below we present results of a new study that supports the conclusion that bare most in subject position has a superlative reading. In Section 5 we address the source for the diverging results of Lidz et al. (2011) and those obtained in Kotek et al. (2011) and in the current study.
Current Experiments
As mentioned above, two previous studies of most, Lidz et al. (2011) and Kotek et al. (2011) use similar methodologies to study the behavior of bare most in subject position. Both studies test the verification of most statements with respect to dot-arrays whose properties are manipulated in various ways. The experiments in this section aim to combine the manipulations in the two previous studies to provide conclusive evidence as to the nature of bare most.
In particular, we use a COLOR manipulation (used in both previous studies), allowing us to create dot-arrays in the 'superlative' condition. We combine this with a WEBER RATIO manipulation used in Lidz et al. (2011) but not in Kotek et al (2011) : under this manipulation, the relative sizes of the Blue set and the non-Blue set are varied. Verification of most statements has been shown by Lidz et al. (2011) to be sensitive to Weber's law (see also Heim et al. 2012; cf. 7 To be more precise, Lidz et al. (2011) do not directly test the existence or absence of the superlative reading, since it is assumed not to exist. Rather, Lidz et al. are concerned with the enumeration of homogeneously colored subsets of the non-blue set -necessary for the calculation of superlative truth-conditions -for other reasons. Their own motivation aside, however, the experimental manipulations in Lidz et al. are able to test for the presence of the superlative reading and their results are consistent with no such reading being used by the participants in their experiment.
Tomaszewicz 2011 for relevant work on Polish), which governs the discriminability of two quantities, (Pica et al. 2004) . Specifically, Lidz et al. (2011) showed that the accuracy of the verification of most statements increases gradually as the ratio of Blue:non-Blue dots in an array increases. Lastly, we add a DETERMINER manipulation used in Kotek et al. (2011) but not in Lidz et al. (2011) : we compare the verification of most to that of more than half, which is unambiguously proportional. The canonical analysis of more than half is given in (8). Under the lexical approach to most (6b), more than half is truth-conditionally equivalent to bare most: both unambiguously only have proportional truth-conditions and are true in exactly the same cases. Under the structural ambiguity approach to most (6c), on the other hand, most has a reading which more than half lacks --the superlative reading --and hence the two determiners are predicted to behave differently under the 'superlative' condition: more than half will be unambiguously false, but most will have a true reading.
(8) ⟦more than half⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff |AB| > ½ |A| Finally, the experiments presented here follow Kotek et al. (2011) in imposing no constraints on how long participants can see the dot-array in a trial or on how much time they take to make their True/False decision. This diverges from the methodology of Lidz et al. (2011) , who only present the dot-arrays to their subjects for 150ms. In Section 5 we discuss the implications of this choice, which we believe are crucial for understanding the differences between the results obtained by the two previous studies of most.
Experiment 1
This study provides baseline data on the use of an experimental design that combines the WEBER RATIO manipulation of Lidz et al. (2011) with the DETERMINER manipulation of Kotek et al. (2011) . In particular, we are interested in (a) establishing the behavior of more than half with regard to dot arrays of varying Weber ratios, and (b) understanding how participants verify most and more than half when the time allotted to the task is not restricted.
Methods and materials
In each trial in Experiment 1, participants were shown a picture containing 20-21 dots and a sentence describing that picture. Participants were asked to judge whether what the sentence said was true or false of the picture. Target trials were paired with one of the two statements in (9)-(10), where, as in the Lidz et al. (2011) study, the sentence was always about the blue dots. DETERMINER was a between-subject factor: participants saw only most statements or only more than half statements, and those statements were paired with the exact same pictures across conditions.
(9) Most of the dots are blue (10) More than half of the dots are blue All the pictures in Experiment 1 contained Blue and Yellow dots. Table 1 indicates the number of Blue and Yellow dots and the Blue:Yellow ratio for the 9 target trials in Experiment 1. Weber ratios  1, where the truth-conditions of most and more than half predict that the statements in (9)-(10) are false ("false-ratios"), are colored in gray. Weber ratios > 1, where the truth-conditions of most and more than half predict that the statements in (9)-(10) are true ("trueratios"), are colored in white. In addition to the 9 target trials, Experiment 1 contained 24 filler trials. The 9 target figures used in the experiment are shown in Figure 3 . Fillers had unambiguously correct answers. 8 of the filler items contained the determiner more than n for different numbers n, and 8 contained the determiner many and 8 contained the determiner more than n% or more than n/m for different ns and ms. In half of the filler trials, the correct answer was true and in the other half it was false. The items were presented in one of two pseudo-randomized orders where each pair of target items was separated by at least one filler item, and the first item was not a target item. The survey was posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid at the rate of $0.20 for their participation. They were asked to indicate their native language, but payment was not contingent on their response.
Results
195 native speakers of English participated in this study.
8 97 subjects participated in the 'most' condition and 98 participated in the 'more than half' condition. Four non-native speakers and one subject who did not report on their native language were excluded from the analysis. No subjects were excluded from the analysis because of low accuracy rates (<75% on all filler trials). Figure 4 shows the average percent of true responses to Most of the dots are blue and More than half of the dots are blue for the 9 ratios of Experiment 1 (N=195). We observe an inflection point: for false-ratios, the percent of True responses is near zero. For true-ratios, the percent of True responses is at 77% and 85% for most and more than half respectively for the ratio 1.1 and at 90% and nearly 100% for most and more than half respectively for all ratios above 1.1. Importantly, we also observe an intriguing asymmetry between the behavior of most and more than half: Although the verification behavior of most is almost identical to that of more than half for all false-ratios, the two determiners come apart for true-ratios. We observe a parallel proportion of true judgments for most and more than half, with most consistently verified as true 5-7% less often than more than half.
A mixed effects logit model was fit to the data. 9 The model examines the effect of the WEBER RATIO (with 9 levels as specified in Table 1 above) as well as DETERMINER (most vs. more than half) on percent-true in Experiment 1. The random effect structure includes random intercepts for both subjects and items, and by-subject random slopes for the effects of WEBER 8 Here and in Experiment 2 results are reported for all native speakers of English, including those who speak a second language. The results do not change if only mono-lingual speakers are included in the analysis. 9 The models reported in the paper were fit using R and the R packages lme4 (Bates and Maechler, 2009 ). The DETERMINER predictor was contrast coded as follows:
DETERMINER: Most = 0.5 More than half = -0.5
Random effect structures in our models are the maximal ones supported by the data and log-likelihood tests comparing models with the effects to models from which they were removed (cf. Baayen, Davidson, and Bates, 2008; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily 2013) .
RATIO. 10 The fixed effects are summarized in the following We find a main effect of WEBER RATIO and an interaction between WEBER RATIO and DETERMINER. Because of the strong co-linearity between the main effect of DETERMINER and the interaction of DETERMINER and WEBER RATIOS, we do not put any weight on the nearsignificant main effect of DETERMINER found in this model.
Discussion
Experiment 1 yielded two important findings. First, the verification of most and more than half is sensitive to the Weber ratio such that arrays with ratios below 1 are judged false and arrays above 1 are judged true. This is, of course, just a reflection of the truth-conditional import of these determiners. Second, we find that although most and more than half are truth-conditionally equivalent in all target items of Experiment 1, the verification of the two determiners is notably different: most patterns with more than half for verification of items with ratios below and equal to 1: they are judged as true less than 10% of the time; for ratios above 1, on the other hand, most and more than half exhibit parallel behavior but most is judged as true on average 5-7% less often than more than half in all 4 true trials. This result may reflect a higher confidence in false judgments than true judgments for most for the items in our study, but no such asymmetry in confidence for more than half. We return to this point in the discussion in Section 4.1. To conclude, although the task demands are different in Experiment 1 compared to the task in Lidz et al. (2011) , we find a similar effect of the WEBER RATIO on the verification of most. Experiment 2 builds in this finding by adding a COLOR manipulation to the WEBER RATIO one.
Experiment 2: Ratio-by-Color manipulation
Experiment 2 expands on the results of Experiment 1 and explores the simultaneous effect of WEBER RATIO and COLOR on the verification of statements containing most and more than half. Pictures in this experiment have either two or three colors. The presence of a third color in the picture is predicted to have an effect only on those determiners that can be evaluated using subsets of the non-Blue set separately. Consequently, more than half is expected not to be sensitive to the COLOR manipulation. Under the lexical ambiguity view of most, most is also predicted not to be sensitive to the COLOR manipulation, because it only has a proportional reading. Under the structural ambiguity view, most is predicted to be sensitive to the COLOR manipulation, because it has a superlative reading under which the Blue set is compared to the Yellow set and to the Red set separately. Moreover, a 'superlative' verification strategy of most is expected to be sensitive not only to the presence of multiple subsets of non-Blue dots, but also to their structure: following Weber's law, a most statement is predicted to be more difficult to verify against a picture with a Blue:Yellow:Red ratio of 10:10:1, compared to a picture with a ratio of 10:6:5, even though the overall Blue:non-Blue ratio is the same in both cases. That is, Experiment 2 tests not only the effect of COLOR but also the effect of different WEBER RATIOS within the non-Blue set on the verification of most and more than half.
Methods and materials
Experiment 2 combines the DETERMINER and WEBER RATIO manipulations of Experiment 1 with an additional COLOR manipulation: dot arrays in Experiment 2 either had two colors or three colors. We used three different ways of constructing 3-COLOR arrays by varying the ratios of Blue:Yellow and Blue:Red dots. In what follows, we will refer to these ratios as COLOR RATIOS. Pictures in the 2-COLOR condition contained Blue and Yellow dots, and pictures in the 3-COLOR condition contained Blue, Yellow and Red dots. In the BALANCED condition, the Yellow and Red dots were split up evenly. In the MILDLY BALANCED condition, the dots were split up somewhat evenly, but with more Yellow than Red dots. In the UNBALANCED condition, pictures contained one Red dot and all the other non-Blue dots were Yellow. Pictures used 9 different WEBER RATIOS: four below 1; one at exactly 1; and four above 1, all identical to those used in Experiment 1. These WEBER RATIOS were held constant across the 2-COLOR condition and the three 3-COLOR conditions. The overall number of dots in the pictures was again 20-21.
The design of Experiment 2 is summarized in Table 3 below. Each row corresponds to one COLOR level (2C, 3C-UNBALANCED, 3C-MILDLY BALANCED, 3C-BALANCED). Each column 1-9 represents one WEBER RATIO. There are a total of 26 different COLOR RATIOS distributed across the COLOR conditions. Each cell in Table 3 provides two pieces of information: the numbers of Blue, Yellow and Red dots in that cell, and the COLOR RATIO of Blue:Yellow dots in the cell (in brackets). Note that for cells in the 2C condition, the COLOR RATIO is the same as the WEBER RATIO, since there is only one non-Blue color in those trials. Within each column, the WEBER RATIO is held constant, and the COLOR RATIO is manipulated in the different COLOR conditions. In Table 3 there are four WEBER RATIOS, in columns 6-9, for which most is expected to be judged true under both the superlative and proportional reading. In columns 1-5, most and more than half are false under the proportional reading. The darker shaded cells in Table 3 represent 'superlative' pictures, which are true under the superlative reading of most. These pictures contain dot arrays with WEBER RATIOS below 1 (as can be seen in the corresponding 2C cell in the same column), but COLOR RATIOS above 1, as the number in brackets in those cells show.
The 36 target pictures used in Experiment 2 are given in Figure 5 . Below each picture we indicate the numbers of Blue:Yellow:Red dots in the picture and the Blue:Yellow COLOR RATIO (in brackets) for that picture. For the 2C items, the same pictures were used as in Experiment 1. 
Fig. 5 Dot arrays of target items in Experiment 2
We can make the following prediction: if most has a superlative reading -that is, if most can be verified using the COLOR RATIOS (Blue:Yellow and Blue:Red), instead of the WEBER RATIO (Blue:non-Blue), we expect speakers to judge most statements in the 'superlative' pictures as true more often than other pictures in the same column (i.e., pictures that have the same Weber ratio but are false under the superlative reading). Furthermore, this behavior should track Weber's law similarly to the behavior we observed for the WEBER RATIOS in Experiment 1: higher COLOR RATIOS should be easier to verify than ratios that are closer to 1. On the other hand, if most only has a proportional reading, which is truth-conditionally equivalent to that of more than half, it should not be affected by the COLOR RATIOS. Under this approach we predict all cells in a given column in Table 3 to be similarly rated for most, and the same is expected for more than half as well. The predictions for the trials which are false under the proportional reading are summarized in (11) below. To test these predictions, target trials in Experiment 2 were paired with one of the two statements in (12)- (13), where the sentence was always about the Blue dots. As in Experiment 1, DETERMINER was a between-subject factor: participants verified the pictures shown in Figure 5 either against most statements or against more than half statements (but no participant was given both most and more than half statements).
(12) Most of the dots are blue (13) More than half of the dots are blue
The experiment contained 72 filler items, in addition to the 36 target items. Fillers had unambiguously correct answers. 24 of the filler items contained the determiner more than n for different ns, 24 contained the determiner many, and 24 contained the determiner more than n% or more than n/m for different ns and ms. In half of the filler trials, the correct answer was true and in the other half it was false. The items were presented in surveys in one of 8 pseudorandomized orders where each two target items was separated by at least one filler item, and the first item was not a target item.
The surveys were posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid at the rate of $0.20 for their participation. They were asked to indicate their native language, but payment was not contingent on their response.
Results
251 native speakers of English participated in this study. 135 subjects participated in the 'most' condition and 116 participated in the 'more than half' condition. In addition to these participants, 3 subjects were excluded from the analysis because of low accuracy rates (<75% for the more than n trials); 13 9 were excluded because they were non-native speakers and 62 participants were excluded because they did not complete at least one trial in the experiment. Figure 6 shows the average percent of true responses to most statements on the left and to more than half statements on the right for the 9 WEBER RATIOS of Experiment 2. Each COLOR condition is plotted separately. For all four COLOR conditions, we observe a clear inflection point: For Weber ratios > 1 -where the truth-conditions of most and more than half predict that the statements in (12)- (13) are true-the percent of true responses is above 65% for the ratio 1.1 and near 90% for the other data points. For WEBER RATIOS  1 -where the proportional truthconditions of most and more than half predict that the corresponding most and more than half statements are false -the percent of true responses is very low. Importantly, we also see in Figure 6 an effect of the COLOR manipulation in the 'superlative' trials for most but not for more than half. To discuss it in more detail, we will examine the four graphs in Figure 7 . These graphs compare participants' behavior for each COLOR condition for most and more than half. Recall that DETERMINER was a between-subject factor and that participants saw the same pictures matched with a most statement in the 'most' condition and with a more than half statement in the 'more than half' condition. Several effects of interest are apparent in these graphs, which we discuss in turn below.
Fig. 7
Comparison of most and more than half broken down by COLOR conditions Let us begin by examining the 2C graph, which contains the same pictures that were used in Experiment 1 (see Figure 4) . We can clearly observe again the asymmetry property of most: most behaves the same as more than half for WEBER RATIOS  1: it is judged true at very low rates, close to 0%. For WEBER RATIOS > 1, however, the behavior of most diverges from that of more than half. More than half is symmetric and sharply changes from true rates close to 0% to true rates close to 100% precisely when its truth-conditions predict that it would: at the first WEBER RATIO > 1. Most, on the other hand, has a more gradual increase in true judgments for WEBER RATIOS > 1, and even at the highest WEBER RATIO, 1.5, it is still judged true less often than more than half. In fact, when examining WEBER RATIOS > 1 for all COLOR conditions, we find that most is consistently judged true less often than more than half for the true Weber ratios. This is the same pattern that we observed in Experiment 1. We will expand on this point in Section 4.1.
Next let us consider more closely the behavior of most for WEBER RATIOS  1 in the different COLOR conditions. We observe a difference in the behavior of most compared to more than half. Although all pictures have WEBER RATIOS  1 (false under proportional truth-conditions), some pictures have COLOR RATIO > 1 (true under superlative truth-conditions). These pictures are: (a) In the UNBALANCED condition: data point 5 (WEBER RATIO = 1; COLOR RATIO = 1.11); (b) In the MILDLY BALANCED condition: data points 3-5 (WEBER RATIOS = 0.82, 0.91, 1; COLOR RATIOS = 1.13, 1.25, 1.42); and (c) In the BALANCED condition: data points 1-5 (WEBER RATIOS = 0.65, 0.75, 0.82, 0.91, 1; COLOR RATIOS = 1.33, 1.5, 1.5, 1.67, 1.67). As can be observed in Figures 6-7, we see an increase in true responses to most statements compared to more than half statements precisely in these 9 pictures.
A mixed effects logit model was fit to the data. The model examines how percent true in Experiment 2 was affected by the five predictors listed in (14), as well as the interaction of DETERMINER with the three other predictors. The random effect structure for the model included random intercepts for subjects and items, and by-subject random intercepts and slopes for all of the fixed effects. The model thus tested the effect of the WEBER RATIO and COLOR RATIO manipulations on most vs. more than half and also tested the presence of a superlative reading for both most and more than half by including the predictors PROPTC and SUPTC.
14 The fixed effects of the model are summarized in Table 4 . (14) Predictors included in the model for Experiment 2 a. DETERMINER (2 levels) -more than half or most b. WEBER RATIO (9 levels) -as specified in Table 3 above c. COLOR RATIOS (26 levels) -as specified in Table 3 The results show main effects of DETERMINER, WEBER RATIO and PROPTC. That is, we find that most is verified differently than more than half, but that both are affected by the WEBER RATIO manipulation and by proportional truth conditions. Additionally, we find DETERMINERWEBER RATIO and DETERMINERSUPTC interactions, such that more than half is affected by the WEBER RATIO manipulation more than most is, while most is affected by superlative truth conditions more than more than half is. Finally, we find a marginally significant DETERMINERCOLOR RATIOS interaction, such that the ratio of Blue:Yellow dots in the pictures affected the verification of most more than more than half.
Discussion
We see three main effects in Experiment 2: WEBER RATIO, PROPTC and DETERMINER. We find that the WEBER RATIO affects the verification of both most and more than half such that the true responses to both most and more than half statements increase as the ratio of Blue:non-Blue increases. Furthermore, both determiners are verified as true more often when proportional truthconditions are met -that is, when there are more Blue dots than non-Blue dots in the picture (WEBER RATIO > 1). The main effect of DETERMINER indicates that most is judged true more often than more than half is. As can be seen in Figure 6 , this result is caused by the 'superlative' pictures in the 'most' condition, where we observe that most statements are judged as true more often than more than half statements are. In fact, as this observation suggests, the main effect of DETERMINER is driven by the DETERMINERSUPTC interaction -that is, we see an increase in true responses to 'superlative' pictures for most but not more than half.
The DETERMINERWEBER RATIO interaction suggests that WEBER RATIOS contribute more to the verification of more than half than to the verification of most. This is so because, as we have seen, more factors contribute to the verification of most statements than more than half statements, and these factors mediate the contribution of the WEBER RATIOS themselves. Finally, the marginally significant interaction of DETERMINERCOLOR RATIOS suggests that the ratio of Blue:Yellow dots in the pictures affected the verification of most in our experiment. The fact that this interaction is not significant is due to the highly co-linear effect of SUPTC and to the fact that for many of the trials in Experiment 2, COLOR RATIOS are not needed in order to successfully verify a most statement, because the truth of the statement can be determined solely based on the WEBER RATIO or proportional truth-conditions.
One final result of Experiment 2 is the replication of Experiment 1 in the 2-COLOR condition: we again see the asymmetry property of most, where false trials are judged as false close to 100% of the time, but true trials are judged as true only 90% of the time or less. For more than half, by comparison, we find no difference between the verification of false and true trials: both are at close to 100%. Furthermore, as in Experiment 1, we see that trials with WEBER RATIO = 1 are verified as false close to 90% of the time. These results suggest that although participants in Experiment 2 were exposed to many more pictures than participants in Experiment 1, the diversity of the pictures and the increase in the number of decisions participants had to make did not change the nature of the judgments that we observe in the two experiments. Instead, we see participants accessing the same underlying cognitive system to verify the most and more than half statements in the two experiments.
In this section we discuss the results of Experiments 1-2 with regard to the debate over the correct analysis of most. We will show that postulating a superlative reading of bare most in subject position explains the pattern of results observed in the experiments and argue that the results are unexplained under the lexical ambiguity view. We then discuss differences between most and more than half that emerge from the experiments.
Most in subject position has a genuine superlative reading
Recall that the starting point for our experiments was the comparison between a lexical ambiguity view of most and a structural ambiguity view of most. The lexical ambiguity view predicts that bare most only has proportional truth-conditions while the structural ambiguity view predicts that bare most is ambiguous between the two readings in (15) repeated from above. For the superlative reading to be detectable, dot arrays in the 'superlative' condition are required. That is, we need pictures that make a most statement false under proportional truthconditions but true under superlative truth-conditions. If speakers verify most statements only according to proportional truth-conditions, we expect them to judge Most of the dots are blue as false in such pictures. If they can access superlative truth-conditions, they will be able to judge the same statement as true in that case. All speakers are expected to judge a more than half statement as false when verified against those same pictures.
Previous experimental works , Tomaszewicz 2011 , Heim et al. 2012 ) have shown that most is sensitive to Weber's law such that most statements are more difficult to verify in arrays with close Blue:non-Blue ratios compared to arrays in which the two numerosities are further apart. Experiment 1 showed that this result holds not only when the arrays are presented for very short durations, as was done in all previous studies of most, but also when participants are given as much time as they need to make their decision.
Experiment 2 built on the WEBER RATIO manipulation of Experiment 1 and compared subjects' behavior in 'superlative' pictures in which not only the Blue:non-Blue ratio was varied, but also the composition of the non-Blue set. We tested three different 'superlative' conditions, where the ratios of Blue:Yellow and Blue:Red dots (COLOR RATIOS) were systematically varied. Following Weber's law, we suspected that if participants use a 'superlative' verification strategy to verify most statements, the ease with which they use this strategy will be affected by the ratios of the Blue:Yellow and Blue:Red comparisons. If the ratios are closer to 1, the verification of the most statement will be difficult; on the other hand, as the ratios get larger, speakers will have an easier time verifying the statement as true under superlative truth-conditions. Indeed, Experiment 2 showed that when speakers verify most statements, 'superlative' pictures were judged true more often than other pictures with the same Blue:non-Blue ratio that were false under the superlative reading. Furthermore, there was an increase in the rate of true answers to most statements as the COLOR RATIOS increased. This pattern is consistent with the view that bare most has a superlative reading and it is inconsistent with the view that bare most only has a proportional reading that is truth-conditionally equivalent to more than half.
Upon closer examination of the 'superlative' pictures, we note that although the rates of true responses to most statements were clearly above other pictures with the same ratios that were not in the 'superlative' condition, these rates were overall rather low and, in fact, almost without exception below 50%. This seems, prima facie, unexpected on the structural ambiguity view since this view predicts that superlative pictures can be judged as true under the superlative reading of most. One might thus expect substantial rates of true responses to 'superlative' pictures, reflecting the superlative reading of most. However, this prediction can only be made if the two readings of most are equally accessible to speakers during the verification task. As was shown by Kotek et al. (2011) , the ambiguity of bare most in subject position is in fact heavily unbalanced in favor of the proportional reading. That is, the superlative reading of most is latent and often masked by the more dominant proportional reading. Moreover, Kotek et al. (2011) showed that the superlative reading of most was only available to about one third of the speakers in each of their three experiments. Assuming the same prevalence of the superlative reading in our participants, this means that rates of true responses to 'superlative' pictures should be lower than the rates of true responses to pictures that are true on both the proportional and the superlative reading. In the latter case a 'true' response is available to all speakers under whichever reading they verify while in the former a 'true' response is available only to some of the speakers some of the time.
To further investigate the hypothesis that the superlative reading was only accessible to some of the participants in Experiment 2, below we classify participants in the 'most' condition in Experiment 2 as "proportional" or "superlative" speakers according to whether or not they accessed superlative truth-conditions in the verification of most. 15 The criterion we use for the classification of participants is given in (16). The idea is that if speakers do not use superlative truth-conditions in the verification of bare most, they will verify all proportionally-false trials as false with the same error-rate: that is, they are not more likely to reply true to pictures in the 'superlative' condition than to other pictures with the same Weber ratio that are false under the superlative reading. On the other hand, speakers who use a superlative verification strategy are more likely to verify a most statement as true in 'superlative' pictures compared to other pictures with the same Weber ratio that are false under superlative truth-conditions. Hence, if speakers replied true more often in the 3C-BALANCED condition (where all five proportionally-false trials could be judged as true under superlative truth-conditions) than in the 3C-UNBALANCED condition (where only one proportionally-false trial could be judged as true under superlative truth-conditions), we classify them as "superlative," otherwise we classify them as "proportional" speakers.
Using the criterion in (16), we find that 79 participants in the most condition are classified as "proportional" speakers, and the other 56 are classified as "superlative." These numbers are comparable with Kotek et al. (2011) 's numbers. Figure 8 shows the percent of true responses to all target trials in Experiment 2 broken down by the classification of "proportional" and "superlative" most speakers.
Fig. 8 Percent true for most-sup (left) and most-prop (right) in Experiment 2
The classification of speakers in Figure 8 indeed sharpens the results: we find that there is little variation among the different COLOR conditions for "proportional" participants, but there is a strong effect within the "superlative" participants. In particular, all five 'superlative' trials in the 3C BALANCED condition, three such trials in the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition and the one trial in the 3C UNBALANCED condition are judged true more often than parallel trials that are false under both the superlative and proportional readings in the case of most-sup (on the left) but not most-prop (on the right).
To see whether the classification in (16) identifies internally consistent subgroups of speakers in Experiment 2, we can compare the behavior of participants who were classified as "proportional" and the behavior of participants in the 'more than half' condition. Since both groups of speakers are assumed to have verified most and more than half using proportional truth-conditions exclusively, and since most and more than half are truth-conditionally equivalent for those speakers, we expect to find similar verification behavior for most and more than half for those participants. More specifically, we expect similar results to those found in Experiment 1, repeated below for convenience.
Fig. 4 Average percent of true responses in Experiment 1
Since most is not sensitive to COLOR under the proportional reading, we expect to see similar behavior across all four COLOR conditions of Experiment 2 for most and more than half: we expect all false items to be verified as false at very high rates for both most and more than half; we expect more than half to be verified as true at high rates for all true items, and we expect most to be verified as true less often than more than half for those same trials (this reflects the asymmetry property of most, which will be discussed in more detail in section 4.2 below). Figure  9 shows the comparison of most-prop and more than half, broken down by COLOR conditions.
Fig. 9 Comparison of most-prop and more than half broken down by COLOR conditions
Several effects can be observed in the graphs in Figure 9 . First we observe that the behavior of most largely tracks the behavior of more than half for proportionally-false trials. This is as expected if the speakers we classified as 'proportional' can access only a proportional reading for most. Moreover, we see that in proportionally-true trials, most is consistently verified as true less often than more than half is. More than half is generally verified as true at close to ceiling rates for all true trials, but most is almost never verified at the same rates even at the largest WEBER RATIO of 1.5. Finally, we observe that whatever noise is introduced by the particular items used in Experiment 2 (see Figure 5 above) affects most and more than half to the same extent. This noise is particularly visible in the false trials of the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition and some false trials in the 3C UNBALANCED, but importantly it does not have a greater effect on one determiner than the other. This justifies the comparisons we have made here between most and more than half and furthermore motivates close scrutiny of deviations in the verification of most by "superlative" speakers that go beyond the baseline we have just seen.
Next let us compare the behavior of participants who were classified as "superlative" with the behavior of participants who were classified as "proportional" in the 'most' condition. Figure  10 shows the comparison of most-sup and most-prop, broken down by COLOR conditions.
Fig. 10
Comparison of most-sup and most-prop broken down by COLOR conditions Figure 10 clearly demonstrates the presence of a superlative reading of most for participants who were classified as "superlative" speakers. In general, we observe that most-sup is verified as true more often than most-prop for all WEBER RATIOS in all COLOR conditions. This property of most-sup is particularly pronounced in the 'superlative' pictures, where the rates of true responses for most-sup are clearly above those of parallel trials for most-prop and resembles the rates of true responses observed earlier for more than half. This result is precisely what is predicted if bare most has a latent superlative reading when it occurs in subject position that is accessible to some speakers (the "superlative" speakers, most-sup), but it is unexpected if most does not have such a reading. If such a reading did not exist, we would expect to only see behavior consistent with most-prop but not most-sup.
That is, we see a clear difference in the judgment patterns of "superlative" and "proportional" speakers precisely in those pictures that correspond to the 'superlative' condition -that is, pictures that can be verified as true under superlative truth-conditions even though they are false under proportional truth-condition. It is particularly illuminating to compare the behavior of two speaker groups in the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition: this condition did not enter into the calculation used to classify speakers into the two groups, (16), and hence represents the effect of this classification independent of the data used in the classification itself. We observe that the four (proportionally and superlatively) true ratios in this condition were verified as true with similar rates by proportional and superlative speakers. Moreover, we can clearly observe that the first two ratios on the left (false under both readings of most) were verified as false at similar rates for both speaker groups but the next three ratios, all in the 'superlative' condition, exhibit a much higher rate of true responses in the "superlative" group than in the "proportional" group. Recall that, as we observed in Figure 9 , the increase in true rates in these pictures for "proportional" speakers is parallel to that observed for more than half and hence likely reflects noise present in our items rather than superlative verification behavior. The increase observed beyond that for "superlative" pictures cannot be similarly attributed to noise and rather corresponds to a superlative verification strategy. A logit mixed effects model indeed confirms an interaction between Speaker-Type and Superlative Truth-Conditions, such that superlative truth-conditions better predict the verification behavior of speakers who were classified as "superlative' as opposed to those who were classified as 'proportional.' This is consistent with the results apparent in the graph in Figure 10 and predicted by our theory of most as a superlative complex determiner. 16 Finally, we note that if participants in the 'more than half' condition are classified using the same method that was used above for most, (16), no superlative behavior is found in the data. This classification yields 94 subjects who are classified as "proportional" and 22 who are classified as "superlative." As can be observed in Figure 11 , however, the participants who were classified as "superlative" did not use a verification strategy that is compatible with superlative truth-conditions. Instead we observe that the verification behavior in this case is still consistent with proportional truth-conditions, but it is quite noisy. 17 The proportional behavior in the graph on the right, on the other hand, was made sharper by this classification. We can thus verify that the classification we have used above is parsimonious in grouping the noise in Experiment 2 together with the "superlative" data. Furthermore, as predicted by the 16 The model predicted percent Yes from Speaker-Type and Superlative Truth-Conditions. The random effect structure was the maximal supported by the design of Experiment 2 and included by-item intercepts and byparticipant slopes and intercepts for Speaker-Type and Superlative Truth-Conditions. The model also yielded a significant main effect of Superlative Truth-Conditions, but this main effect was highly correlated with the interaction and we therefore do not put weight on it. All other correlations among fixed effects were all within ±0.1. A more specified model that included the additional predictor of COLOR RATIOS did not converge because of the high co-linearity between COLOR RATIOS and Superlative Truth-Conditions. 17 A mixed effects logit model predicting percent Yes from Speaker-Type and Superlative Truth-Conditions for the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition for more than half (similar to the one described for most above, but with a random effect structure including only by-participants and by-item intercepts, as a more specified model did not converge) reveals a main effect of Superlative Truth-Conditions, but no effect of Speaker-Type and no interaction. That is, we observe only one type of speaker in this data, unlike the finding for most. The main effect of truth-conditions indicates that knowing the superlative truth-conditions improves the model predictions compared to having no information about the pictures at all. This is as expected, given that superlative truth-conditions and proportional truth-conditions converge for 6 out of the 9 ratios in the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition. truth-conditions of more than half, no superlative behavior is observed even for those participants who were classified as noisy by the criterion in (16). Hence, the superlative behavior we observe for most is not an artifact of our classification of subjects or of the design of our experiment. Rather, it is genuinely attributable to the truth-conditional import of bare most.
Most vs. More than half
In this section we return to the discussion of the differences between most and more than half observed in Experiments 1-2. We noticed two such differences, having to do with the effect of COLOR on the two determiners, and with the asymmetry property of most.
We begin with a discussion of the effect of COLOR. As shown in Section 3.2, we find an effect of COLOR on most but not more than half. More specifically, we argued in Section 4.1 that there is an effect of COLOR on those speakers who we classified as "superlative" speakers, but not on those who are "proportional" speakers. This effect is consistent with the fact that bare most behaves as unambiguously proportional for some speakers and as ambiguous between a dominant proportional reading and a latent superlative reading for other speakers, while more than half is unambiguously a proportional determiner for all speakers and is hence predicted not to be sensitive to the COLOR manipulation of Experiment 2. These findings are consistent with the results of Kotek et al. (2011) .
An unexpected additional difference between most and more than half that we observed in Experiments 1-2 is the asymmetry property of most. Recall that in both experiments we saw that in the 2-COLOR condition, 18 the verification behavior of more than half resembles a step-function that changes sharply from true rates close to zero for all false trials to true rates close to 100% for all true trials. For most, we observe parallel low true rates for all false trials but the true rates are lower than those of more than half for all true trials. Furthermore, the first true ratio for most is judged as true only 77%, while other ratios are judged as true 90% or above. Although never formally recognized or explained in any previous literature on most, the asymmetry property has been observed for most in prior experimental work (Yosef Grodzinsky, p.c.) . A related observation can be found in the corpus work comparing most and more than half in Solt (2011). Solt examined the use of most and more than half in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) (Davies 2008) , and found that more than half was typically used to describe percentages between fifty and sixty-five percent, while most was rarely used for percentages below sixty percent.
19 Below are some examples from the COCA corpus, taken from Solt (2011) . (17) Solt (2011) describes several additional differences between most and more than half that stem from the kinds of nouns that these two determiners normally combine with (kind vs. groupdenoting), the overall higher frequency in the corpus of most compared to more than half, and their normal usage to describe generic vs. 'survey results' readings, respectively. Solt also shows that most is used more often with vague and uncountable domains, while more than half appears less compatible with such domains, as illustrated in (19) (also from Solt 2011).
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(19) a. But like most things, obesity is not spread equally across social classes b. ?But like more than half of things, obesity is not spread equally across social classes We see, then, that although most and more than half are truth-conditionally equivalent, they are used in different contexts. Both determiners are false under the exact same conditions, and hence we can understand why they are judged as false at very high rates for all false conditions in Experiments 1-2. However, while both determiners are true in all the same cases, they are not used in the same way. As Solt shows, more than half is more often used for proportions that are close to fifty percent, and most is more often used for proportions above sixty-five percent. This fact may be the cause for the difference in rates of true judgments for most and more than half in Experiments 1-2: we may view the true responses to our trials as reflecting speakers' confidence in the truth of the corresponding statement, or alternatively reflecting its felicity in the context.
As we have seen, participants verify more than half statements as true at very high rates for all true ratios, including those that are very close to WEBER RATIO 1: these are contexts in which more than half is often used felicitously. On the other hand, most is used less often in such contexts, and hence most is judged as true less often in these cases. As the Weber ratio increases, the percent of speakers who find the most statement felicitous increases too, as predicted by Solt's corpus findings. Furthermore, since the highest proportion of Blue dots found in our pictures was only sixty percent of the total number of dots, we can understand why even at the highest WEBER RATIO in our experiments, more than half is consistently judged as true more often than most for all COLOR conditions: as Solt shows, sixty percent is still within the range of percentages for which speakers tend to prefer to use more than half as opposed to most.
To conclude, we can attribute the asymmetry property of most to the pragmatics of its usage. Although most is true in the same cases as more than half (under proportional truth-conditions), it is less often used to describe pictures with the proportions that were found in our experiments compared to more than half. Furthermore, it is predicted that both determiners will be clearly judged as false in all false pictures because the conditions of use of both determiners entail that both most and more than half statements are infelicitous in such cases.
Comparison with Lidz et al. (2011)
In this section we review the results of a previous sentence verification study of most conducted by Lidz et al. (2011) . Although similar to our study in many ways, this study reached opposing conclusions to those we reported above. 21 That is, while we have found that most is ambiguous between a dominant proportional reading and a latent superlative reading, Lidz et al. reach the conclusion that most is unambiguous and only has the proportional reading. Below we survey Lidz et al.'s study and discuss the source for the conflicting findings of this study and the results we reached above. We argue that the source of the difference lies in the design of the study in Lidz et al. and additionally in the way the results of the study were interpreted.
Lidz et al. (2011)
Lidz et al. (2011) The number of COLORS used in the arrays (2, 3, 4, or 5) . If determining the cardinalities of all the subsets of non-Blue dots is part of the verification procedure of most statements, as is expected if a speaker verifies Most of the dots are blue using a strategy that is compatible with superlative truth-conditions, then increasing the number of homogeneously colored subsets of non-Blue dots should make the verification of most increasingly difficult. 22 An important aspect of the study was that each dot array was presented 21 The results of Lidz et al. (2011) also differ from our findings in Kotek et al. (2011) , which were consistent with the findings of our Experiment 2: that bare most in subject position is ambiguous between a dominant proportional reading and a latent superlative reading. 22 To be precise, Lidz et al. (2011) never entertained the possibility that bare most could have a superlative reading. Instead, the reason for the COLOR manipulation in their experiment was to identify the correct statement of the proportional truth-conditions of most, cf. (20a-b). However, despite the lack of direct probing of a superlative for only 150ms. This made a verification strategy based on counting all the dots individually impossible. Instead, participants had to rely on estimating the magnitudes of the relevant sets of dots, a process whose accuracy is governed by the Weber ratio, (e.g. Pica et al. 2004) . Moreover, as Halberda, Sires and Feigenson (2006) have shown, the number of sets whose cardinality participants can successfully estimate at such brief exposure times is limited to the entirety of all dots and two subsets. When the task requires estimating more than two subsets in addition to the total set, performance drops off markedly. Based on this observation, Lidz et al. reasoned that verifying most statements using a strategy that requires estimating the size of each homogenously colored subset of dots individually should be markedly more difficult and no longer be predicted by the Weber ratio when the number of colors used in the array is 3, 4, or 5.
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However, this is not what they found in their study. Rather, their results, shown in Figure 12 from Lidz et al. (2011) , indicate a marked insensitivity to the number of colors as well as a strong dependency on the Weber ratio. Fig. 12 Results of the most experiment in Lidz et al. (2011) 24 Since their results show no effect of COLOR, Lidz et al. (2011) conclude that the composition of the non-Blue set could not have played a direct role in the verification of the most statements, as this would have required estimating each homogenously colored subset of non-Blue dots separately and this procedure is expected to be sensitive to the effect of COLOR. Lidz et al. take this results to provide evidence in favor of the analysis of most in (20b) over the more traditional Generalized Quantifier Theory treatment in (20a). 25 verification strategy of most, the logic of Lidz et al.'s experiment can be used to test for the presence such a strategy, as we explain in the text. 23 Whether performance should break down when there are 3 colors in the array or only when there are 4 or more is somewhat unclear given the results in Halberda et al. (2006) . Whatever the answer to this question may be, this does not change the interpretation of the experiment in Lidz et al. since there was no effect of color across all levels. 24 Figure reproduced with permission of the authors. 25 To make this argument Lidz et al. rely on additional assumptions that provide a bridge between the two hypotheses in (20) and how speakers verify statements in general. An in-depth discussion of these assumptions would lead us to far afield here, and it is peripheral to our main argument-that most must be analyzed as a superlative structure-because both (20a-b) are inconsistent with the superlative behavior observed in our study. The discussion of (20a-b) aside, note that the lack of effect of COLOR also implies that bare most could not have been verified using a superlative verification strategy in Lidz et al.'s (2001) experiment. Such a strategy would have required the estimation of each homogeneously colored subset of the non-Blue set separately, and that behavior is predicted to be sensitive to COLOR. Instead, only proportional truth-conditions must have been available to participants in Lidz et al.'s experiment. However, as our experiment shows, superlative truth-conditions are in principle available to speakers who verify most statements. Since neither (20a) nor (20b) is compatible with the superlative reading of bare most that we have documented in our results, we will refrain from adjudicating between (20a-b). Despite this being Lidz et al.'s central agenda, both statements are varieties of the lexical ambiguity view of most and hence cannot account for the superlative behavior found in our results. On the other hand, as we have argued for above, this behavior is accounted for, and predicted by, a structural ambiguity view of most.
Explaining the divergence between Lidz et al. and the present study
In this section we explore the difference between Lidz et al. (2011) and the study reported in this paper. Recall that both studies explored the verification of bare most in subject position through experiments that manipulated the COLOR and WEBER RATIOS of the dots in the pictures against which a most statement was verified. The present study also used a DETERMINER manipulation to compare the behavior of most to that of more than half. Lidz et al. (2011) found an effect of WEBER RATIOS but no effect of COLOR, such that all four COLOR conditions in their experiment were verified with similar levels of accuracy. The present study found an effect of WEBER RATIOS as well but in addition it also found an effect of COLOR for most but not more than half, such that most statements were consistently judged as true significantly more often for 'superlative' pictures than for pictures with the same WEBER RATIOS that were false under the superlative reading. A similar effect of COLOR was also found in Kotek et al. (2011) , who used a COLOR manipulation with WEBER RATIOS very close to 1 and found that pictures that contained 3 colors and were true only under the superlative reading were judged as true more often than corresponding pictures with the same ratios that contained just 2 colors. This result led Kotek et al. as well as the present study to adopt a view of most that is compatible with the structural ambiguity view of most, under which most is the superlative form of many (Hackl 2009) .
We see, then, that both Lidz et al. and the present study use a COLOR manipulation and a WEBER RATIO manipulation. However, only the present study, following Kotek et al., also uses a Determiner manipulation; this manipulation helps to ensure that whatever results are obtained for most can be attributed to the semantics and verification procedures associated with most, rather than some general difficulty related to the design of the experiments or to its participants. If that were the case, we would expect the verification of more than half to be affected in a similar manner to that of most. Additionally, if most is unambiguously a proportional determiner and truth-conditionally equivalent to more than half, as predicted by the lexical ambiguity view of most, we again expect any experimental manipulation to affect these two determiners equally.
One important source of difference between the experiments is the mode of presentation of dot arrays in them. We saw that the experiments in the present study allowed participants unlimited time to make their decision. The Lidz et al. experiment, on the other hand, used a flash presentation method: participants saw the dot arrays for 150ms and were asked to answer the question: Are most of the dots blue? based on whatever information they could gather within that time frame. We would like to suggest that this design biased participants toward a preference for the use of a verification strategy that is compatible with proportional truth-conditions: recall that participants were always asked the very same question: Are most of the dots blue?, where the color of the dots was not varied and no fillers were used, for 400 trials in this experiment. The flash presentation allows participants to gather enough information to support a proportional verification strategy in all conditions, but a superlative verification strategy is only supported in half of the conditions -when the arrays contained two or three colors but not when they contained four or five colors.
26 Therefore, a sensible participant might adopt a verification procedure that could guarantee a successful verification of the question in all cases -that is, the proportional strategy. One further complication in Lidz et al.'s (2011) study is that they assume that most behaves symmetrically in two ways: first, they assume that most behaves the same for ratios below 1 and ratios above 1. This leads them to collapse data points at the same distance from 1 and use averaged results in their graph and in their statistical analysis. Second, although there is no Weber ratio=1 in their experiment, Lidz et al. assume that it should be judged as true 50% of the time. These two assumptions originate in Lidz et al.'s desire to model the verification of most as a symmetric comparative judgment using the Analog Numbers System (ANS). That is, each verification decision is seen as a decision between n > m and m > n, where n and m are numbers representing the cardinalities of relevant sets. As we have seen in Experiment 2, however, the assumptions made by Lidz et al. (2011) about their data and consequently the modeling that they pursued are not justified. Below we discuss in turn each of these assumptions and their consequences for the correct interpretation of Lidz et al.'s study.
We begin with the plotting methods in Lidz et al. (2011) . Lidz et al. do not report any asymmetry in the behavior of most in their experiment. Instead of plotting the percent of yes responses to the question Are most of the dots blue? in their experiment, Lidz et al. chose to plot percent correct, where the 'correct' response was defined only in terms of the proportional truthconditions of most. Consequently, Lidz et al. averaged data with Weber ratios that were the same distance from 1, disregarding whether the data was above 1 or below 1. For example, the percent correct for ratios such as 9:8 and 8:9 was averaged and plotted as coming from a single ratio. Lidz el al. (2011) also assume that Weber ratio = 1 would be verified by participants as 'correct' 50% of the time.
However, as can be clearly seen in our results of Experiments 1-2, participants consistently judge both most and more than half as false close to 90% of the time at ratio = 1. Consequently, Lidz et al.'s (2011) assumption that participants verify pictures with Weber ratio = 1 as true 50% of the time is also not justified for the data we have presented in this paper. Moreover, the plotting method in Lidz et al.'s (2011) makes it impossible to observe any asymmetry in the data, because of the fact that it collapses true and false trials. Thus, it is impossible to see that proportionally-false most items are verified as such with higher proportions than true items are verified as true.
Given that the plotting method and assumptions about the distribution of the data around Weber ratio = 1 are not supported by the data in our experiments, we believe that it is also not justified to model the verification of most as relying on the ANS in the way Lidz et al. do since their modeling inherently imposes symmetry on the behavior of most: it predicts that the verification of most (under proportional truth-conditions) for Weber ratios that are the same distance from 1 would be similar. Therefore, this modeling is unable to predict that most is consistently judged as false for all Weber ratios  1 and that it is judged as true with lesser confidence for all true trials in our experiments. 27 We do not know whether this kind of modeling may be justified for the data in Lidz et al. (2011) -it might be if there is indeed no asymmetry in their experiment. However, ANS modeling cannot explain the behavior of most in our study. Instead, above we suggested an explanation based on the conditions of use of most and more than half that were found in the corpus study of Solt (2011) . Solt found that although most and more than half are truthconditionally equivalent, more than half tends to be used for percentages in the 50%-65% range, while most was more often used for percentages above 65% (in the case of proportional truthconditions). In all the proportionally-true trials in our Experiments 1-2, the Blue dots were between 50%-65% of the total number of dots. Consequently, participants were likely to judge a more than half statement as true in all these cases, and they were more likely to find the most statement infelicitous (or false). Furthermore, they were more likely to find the most statement felicitous (or true) as the Weber ratio increased. This is precisely the behavior we observe in both Experiments 1-2. 
Conclusion
This paper introduced new evidence regarding the correct semantics of bare most. Previous sentence verification studies of most have reached two quite different conclusions: Kotek et al. (2011) find that most is ambiguous between a dominant proportional reading and a latent superlative reading, while Lidz et al. (2011) find no evidence of such an ambiguity and propose a semantics for most under which is it unambiguously proportional and truth-conditionally equivalent to more than half.
We presented the results of a study that combined the manipulations of the two previous studies and showed that bare most indeed has a superlative reading in subject position. This result is compatible with a decompositional analysis of most, according to which both the most and bare most are built from the same basic ingredients -a gradable predicate many/much and the superlative operator -est -but project different LFs, Hackl (2009) . The results are incompatible with the lexical ambiguity view of most, under which bare most and the most are unrelated lexical items, with bare most exclusive expressing proportional semantics and the most exclusively expressing superlative semantics.
We found two clear differences between most and more than half: first, we found an effect of the number of colors in the pictures against which the two determiners were verified for most but not for more than half precisely in those pictures that were true under the superlative truthcondition of most (but false under the proportional reading). This reflects the fact that most, but not more than half, can be verified using a verification strategy that is compatible with superlative truth-conditions. In addition, we found an asymmetry in the verification of most that was absent in the verification of more than half: while participants were equally confident in their judgment of false trials as false and their judgment of true trials as true -both of which were at rates close to 100% -we observed that most was judged as false with similar confidence as more than half statements for all false items, but it was judged as true about 5-7% less often for all true trials compared to more than half. We argued that this difference can be attributed to the different conditions of use of most and more than half documented in Solt (2011) , where more than half was used to describe proportions of 50-65% and most was more often used for proportions above 60%. Hence, the judgment patterns may reflect differences in the felicity of most statements in our study or in the confidence with which participants were able to verify these statements. All items in our study contained less than 65% Blue dots out of the total number of dots, thus supporting more than half statements more than most statements.
Finally, we explained the differences between the findings of Kotek et al. (2011) and our study compared to Lidz et al. (2011) as stemming from differences in the task demands that may have biased participants in that study towards using a verification strategy that is compatible with proportional truth-condition. We have shown that such a strategy is guaranteed to succeed in all trials in Lidz et al.'s study, while a strategy compatible with superlative truth-conditions is expected to fail in 50% of the trials. We furthermore pointed out difficulties in the way that the data in Lidz et al. (2011) was analyzed and hence in the conclusions that were drawn based on this study. In particular, we believe that the ANS model proposed by Lidz et al. (2011) is unjustified and that the semantics proposed in this paper for most are unsupported.
